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FEDERAL ENERGY RESOURCE LEASING POLICY*
STEPHEN L. McDONALD**
It is generally believed that the greater part of this country's re-
maining undeveloped energy resources-oil and gas, coal, and oil
shale-is to be found on lands subject to federal jurisdiction.' Such
lands are normally made available to private persons for possible
discovery and production of mineral fuels by means of leases, the
terms and conditions of which are prescribed by responsible federal
agencies, chiefly the Bureau of Land Management and the Geological
Survey of the Department of the Interior. In addition to conditions
included in lease contracts, the federal government, chiefly through
the Geological Survey, imposes operating regulations designed to pro-
tect the environment and conserve natural resources. It is obvious
that the policies followed by the government in leasing lands for
mineral fuels production have an important bearing on the future of
the nation's energy economy.
In this article we shall discuss a number of issues relating to leasing
policy, from the basic objective(s) in leasing to the incidental regula-
tion of oil production for conservation purposes. Some issues, such
as the manner of bidding in lease sales and regulation for environ-
mental protection, we shall barely touch upon for reasons of space.
We shall devote most of our attention to the basis of bids (e.g., lease
bonus vs. royalty rate), the rate of leasing, and conservation regula-
tion in the case of oil. We begin with a discussion of what ought to
be the objective in federal land leasing.
THE BASIC OBJECTIVE(S)
As present law is officially interpreted, the major objectives in the
management of publicly owned mineral resources are: "(1) to assure
orderly and timely resource development; (2) to protect the environ-
ment; (3) to insure the public a fair market value return on the
*The research underlying this article was made possible by a generous grant from Re-
sources for the Future, Inc.
**Dr. McDonald is a Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin.
1. Federal Leasing and Disposal Policies, hearings on S. 2727 Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 35-37 (1972) (statement of Harrison
Loesch).
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disposition of its resources. ' No one of these objectives dominates
the others, and it is not clear from the law or official pronounce-
ments how they are to be reconciled if they conflict in application,
as they may. For instance, sufficiently strong measures to protect the
environment may delay development and may also unduly reduce
the value of resources to prospective lessees. Sufficiently rapid offer-
ing of leases may result in less than fair market value being received.
It is not clear in any case just what "orderly and timely" develop-
ment means in practice. On the other hand, these three objectives
may be mutually consistent if we can integrate them into a single
decision rule, such as the one we shall now propose.
We suggest that the federal government should seek to capture a
maximum of the present value of pure economic rent arising from
minerals production on its lands, where "pure economic rent" is the
income which tends to accrue in the long run, under conditions of
perfect competition and the absence of externalities, to the owners
of raw natural resources.
There are several reasons for this proposed rule. First, it gives a
concrete meaning to "orderly and timely" resource development and
"fair market value," while recognizing the need to internalize exter-
nalities such as environmental damages. Second, it is equivalent, in
effect, to the rule that the government should seek to maximize the
present value of resources to society; assuming the labor and capital
employed in minerals extraction have alternative uses, the present
value of pure economic rent as defined is the present value of the
mineral resources to society. Third, pure economic rent is an eco-
nomic surplus, the capture of which by the government does not
affect output, the price level or relative prices, and the allocation of
resources. Fourth, as a form of governmental revenue, economic rent
received substitutes for taxes which would affect output, prices, and
resource allocation. Thus, following the rule would promote eco-
nomic efficiency and tend to maximize the value of resources to
society.
Of course, the government cannot measure pure economic rent a
priori and set the price of leases accordingly. Rather, to follow the
rule it must create conditions conducive to its satisfaction in the
normal process of marketing leases. Thus, conditions which reduce
uncertainty, increase competition, promote the optimum rate of
extraction of minerals, internalize externalities, and relate the rate of
leasing to the capacity of the affected industries all tend to satisfy
the rule. Note that the rule is not the same as that of maximizing the
2. Id. at 38.
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present value of land revenues, for the latter would call for the
disregard of environmental costs and lead to the exploitation of some
minerals whose social cost exceeded their social value. Let us now see
what the rule implies in regard to the several issues noted earlier.
THE MANNER OF LEASE BIDDING
Present law requires that bidding for oil and gas leases on the outer
continental shelf be in the form of sealed bids, but it allows either
sealed bids or oral auction, or a combination, in the competition for
coal or oil and gas leases on the onshore public lands.' In the only
sale of oil shale leases sealed bids were required.4
Under conditions of uncertainty, which typify especially the leas-
ing of lands for oil and gas production, sealed bids are to be preferred
to oral bids. In contrast to oral bidding, sealed bidding is charac-
terized by (1) the absence of certain knowledge by any bidder at the
time he commits himself as to the number and identities of his
competitors for a given tract; (2) the inability of bidders to react to
competitive bids; and (3) by the inability of bidders to give implicit
signals or to engage in punitive bidding. Lacking knowledge of either
the lessor's reservation price or the size of others' bids, the bidder
with the highest valuation cannot tailor his bid to be just above the
reservation price or the second highest valuation, but is motivated to
bid his actual valuation. When bidders are uncertain of the under-
lying quality of mineral deposits, valuations tend to differ widely.
Consequently, the winning sealed bid is likely to be substantially
higher than the winning oral bid would be.' If uncertainty causes
bidders to bid conservatively anyway, the government tends to cap-
ture a larger proportion of the pure economic rent available if sealed
bids are required.
One disadvantage of sealed bidding as presently practiced relative
to oral bidding arises from the fact that, for a given set of tracts in a
sale, all bidding is closed before any individual bids are opened. The
result is that a bidder of limited capital must select a few tracts to
bid upon and, if he fails to be a winner on one or more tracts, has no
opportunity to use the freed funds to bid on other tracts in the same
sale. (Note that the very large bidder may be able to bid on every
3. Onshore oil and gas leases on lands not overlying a known geological structure of a
producing oil or gas field are granted noncompetitively to the first qualified applicant.
Where there are two or more simultaneous applicants, the winner is determined by a draw-
ing.
4. Interview with H. Roy McBroom, Bureau of Land Management, Denver, June 27,
1975.
5. The definitive discussion of this subject is Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy-
Oral Auction versus Sealed Bids, 7 NAT. RES. J. 194 (1967).
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tract put up for lease.) Consequently, (1) small bidders are at a
disadvantage in securing leases and (2) the average number of bids
per tract in a sale is less than it might be. In short, the present system
limits competition in both the short and and the long run. The
remedy is to permit what may be called sequential bidding. After a
tentative closing of bidding in a sale, bids would be opened for
individual tracts in the order of the number of bids per tract. Draw-
ings would be held in the case of ties. The winning bid for each tract
would be announced, but not the identity of the winner; the losers
(or winner) would be permitted to submit new bids on other tracts in
the sale before bids on the latter were opened. This system would
increase the cumbersomeness of a large lease sale, but it would in-
crease the average number of bids per tract and tend to result in
higher winning bids under uncertainty, to say nothing of increasing
the scope of opportunity for relatively small firms. 6 The effective
increase in competition would make it more likely that the govern-
ment captures all the pure economic rent available.
When there is greater certainty as to the underlying value of
mineral deposits, as is usually the case in coal leasing, sealed bidding
offers less relative advantage. Where all parties, including the lessor,
are knowledgeable, the reservation price, the second-highest valua-
tion, and the highest valuation cannot differ much; and the govern-
ment may lose nothing from truly competitive oral bidding. But it
would gain nothing either, relative to truly competitive sealed
bidding with sequential bidding allowed.
THE BASIS OF BIDS
At present mineral leases on federal lands are granted to the high-
est bidder of a lease bonus, the royalty rate being specified in ad-
vance by the lessor." The law covering outer continental shelf leasing
allows royalty bidding also, the lease bonus being specified in ad-
vance; there have been a few experimental sales of oil and gas leases
on this basis. Pending legislation would permit bonus bidding,
royalty bidding, profit share bidding and work commitment bidding
based on a dollar amount for exploration.8
6. The advantage to small firms is two-fold: it allows them to bid on more tracts and this
makes fuller use of available capital; and it reduces pressure on such firms to over-commit
themselves on a few key tracts in a desperate attempt to win at least some.
7. Note the exception given in footnote 2.
8. S. 9, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1977. This bill was passed by the Senate July 15, 1977; the corresponding bill in the House
failed to be reported out of committee in the 1977 session.
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The essential characteristics of bonus bidding are (1) it gives rise to
an often large front-end payment; (2) it settles a heavy burden of risk
and uncertainty on the lessee rather than the lessor; and (3) the
bonus, once paid, becomes a sunk cost that is irrelevant to explora-
tion, development, production and abandonment decisions-except
that the immediate tax write-off of a bonus on surrendered leases
tends to bias decisions in the direction of abandonment of marginal
properties. Only the sunk cost characteristic is favorable to the
objective of maximizing the capture of pure economic rent.
Pure economic rent is the surplus of value over labor and capital
costs. Since no rent is paid by the marginal activity, pure economic
rent does not affect the margin of exploration, development and
production. A lease bonus has precisely these characteristics
(abstracting from the noted inducement to abandon marginal tracts
to secure an immediate tax write-off of the lease bonus). With cer-
tainty and perfect capital markets, it would be the ideal form in
which to capture all pure economic rent.
But, of course, there is great uncertainty facing minerals producers
at the point of leasing. The lessee's exposure to this uncertainty is
maximized by bonus bidding. Uncertainty means, among other
things, that operators cannot finance the proving of deposits exclu-
sively with borrowed funds, e.g., from banks. A substantial propor-
tion of equity capital is required, and given an imperfect equity
capital market, small firms cannot raise such capital on equal terms
with large firms. Small firms must depend more than large firms on
retained earnings. Thus the often large front-end payment associated
with bonus bidding is a barrier to entry and a restraint on competi-
tion in bidding.
This barrier and restraint is reduced by the practice of joint bid-
ding, under which two or more potential lessees submit a single,
common bid for a given tract. Joint bidding allows the smaller opera-
tor to tailor the size of his front-end commitment to his means. It
allows him to spread uncertainty by bidding on a larger number of
prospects. It allows a group to assemble sufficient capital to partici-
pate in the bidding for the most promising, and hence most valuable,
leases.
The question is whether joint bidding increases or decreases the
number of independent bids on the typical tract. It could do either,
of course. Span and Erickson have recently tested several hypotheses
concerning the competitive effects of joint bidding for outer con-
tinental shelf (OCS) oil and gas leases over the period 1954-1973,
during which joint bids rose from about 10 percent to about 85
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
percent of bids cast.9 They found that (1) the average number of
bidders per tract increased substantially over the period; (2) shares of
the larger companies in leases acquired varied widely from sale to
sale, contraindicating collusion designed to fix market shares; (3) the
percentage of winning bids in joint ventures involving nonmajor com-
panies substantially exceeded that involving major companies; (4) the
percentage of winning groups containing no major companies in-
creased significantly, while the percentage of winning groups con-
taining only majors declined over the period; and (5) there were few
cases of nearly identical bids, and in no such cases were groups
involved containing major producers. The authors interpret these
findings as supporting the view that joint bidding has increased, not
decreased competition. We know of no conflicting findings by other
students of the problem. Accordingly, we have reason to believe that
joint bidding significantly reduces the disadvantages of bonus bid-
ding.
The disadvantages are further reduced when bonus bidding is
combined with a modest specified royalty, as is the present practice.
A required royalty tends to shift some uncertainty from the lessee to
the lessor. It reduces the associated lease bonus and lowers the bar-
rier to entry by smaller firms. In these ways it tends to increase the
capture of pure economic rent. In other ways it has contrary effects,
however, as we shall discuss in our analysis of the question of royalty
bidding.
For reasons just suggested, royalty bidding tends to reduce uncer-
tainty borne by the lessee and otherwise facilitates entry and com-
petition in comparison with bonus bidding. It has the major dis-
advantage, however, of adversely affecting the margin of develop-
ment and production. Unlike a bonus, a royalty is a variable
operating cost. The higher it is, the more likely it will result in some
discoveries not being developed and in the early abandonment of all.
This is because a royalty represents a negative cash flow in the
evaluation of expected proceeds from development and production.
The higher the royalty rate, the lower the present value of expected
net cash flow, cet. par.,- thus the fewer discoveries that can be eco-
nomically developed, and the less complete the exhaustion of de-
posits when they can no longer sustain economical production.' 0
In defense of royalty bidding it may be argued (1) that the govern-
ment has the authority under existing law to reduce royalty rates
9. Spann and Erickson, Energy, Risk Sharing and Competition in Joint Ventures for
Offshore Petroleum Exploration, unpublished manuscript (1977).
10. Note that where there is salvageable equipment abandonment occurs when the
present value of expected cash flow from operation fals below net salvage value.
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that are too high to permit economical development and production
of mineral deposits, and (2) that contractual rates established in
royalty bidding are unlikely to be so high as to make early abandon-
ment a problem.
With regard to the first point, if the government were to adjust
freely royalty rates that turned out to be too high, then the com-
petitive system of establishing the winning bidder would tend to
break down. As a record of "appropriate" adjustments was estab-
lished, prospective lessees would tend to bid higher and higher, re-
gardless of their expected costs, and winners would not necessarily
be the most efficient operators. Moreover, the government would
have to go into the business of systematically measuring the costs of
winning bidders, a task that would be costly and would invite charges
of favoritism.
With regard to the second point, the winning royalty bids in the
experimental oil and gas sale of October 1974 were quite high. 1'
They ranged from a low of 51.8 percent to a high of 82.2 percent of
the value of production. The bids by tract were consistent also with
great bidder uncertainty. On the tract valued most highly by the
Geological Survey the bids ranged from 0.5 percent to 82.2 percent.
Such uncertainty is often likely to lead to bids so high as to make
ultimate discoveries uneconomical to develop without readjustment
by the lessor.
Profit share bidding is similar in effects to royalty bidding. It
involves no front-end payment and it reduces the uncertainty borne
by the lessee relative to the bonus bidding system. In the same rela-
tive sense it encourages entry and competition and avoids discrimina-
tion against small firms. In these respects it tends to result in the full
capture of economic rent generated. But also like royalty bidding, it
may preclude the development of socially economical discoveries,
and it may lead to the premature abandonment of producing proper-
ties. With a profit share as a negative cash flow, fewer discoveries
would be economical to develop than under bonus bidding; similarly,
the present value of expected cash flow from continued operation of
a producing property would sooner fall below the net salvage value
of equipment than under a bonus bidding system.
The importance of these last effects would, of course, depend in
part on the definition of profit employed in the profit share system.
They are likely to be most adverse if the IRS definition of profit
were employed, for a normal return on investment would in no way
11. OSC Sale No. 36. The results of the sale are given in An Analysis of the Royalty
Bidding Experiment in OSC Sale No. 36, U.S. Department of the Interior (mimeo.) (1975).
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be sheltered. They are likely to be least adverse if the British
definition were employed. Under the British system, the lessor shares
in gross revenue less operating costs, but only after the total capital
investment times some factor greater than one has been recovered
from operating profits. In any case, the early abandonment effect
would be less severe than under royalty bidding, for a profit share
acts rather like a diminishing royalty as depletion occurs and op-
erating profits per unit decline.
Work commitment bidding, under which the bidder commits him-
self to a specified dollar value of exploration effort, could only lead
to waste. With effective competition, bidders tend to bid away to the
lessor all of the pure economic rent in a prospect. Pure economic
rent, in turn, is a surplus of value over the labor and capital costs of
efficient exploration, development and production. Consequently,
on the typical prospect where there is such a surplus, winning bidders
will tend to commit themselves to more than the efficient amount of
exploration effort; that is, the amount such that marginal cost equals
the marginal value of information acquired. Since operators must
either spend their commitment or forfeit the unspent balance to the
government, they are led to push exploration beyond the point
where marginal cost equals marginal value of information.
All of the above considerations lead the present writer to conclude
that the present system of bonus bidding, with joint bidding and
sequential bidding allowed, and with a modest royalty of 1/8 or 1/6
specified, is preferable. Profit shring, using the British definition of
profit, is a close second best. Royalty bidding is next, and work
commitment bidding least acceptable.
THE RATE OF LEASING
Aside from the strategy of reducing dependence on foreign sources
of energy in the intermediate run, the present value of pure eco-
nomic rent should be maximized by pushing the rate of leasing to the
point where the marginal gain from earlier receipts equals the mar-
ginal loss from increased uncertainty and reduced competition. In
practice such a rule would be imprecise, of course. Alternatively,
consider the issue in this way: assuming the government has unduly
restrained the rate of mineral leasing in the past, to what degree
should the rate of offering lands for lease be accelerated? With regard
to oil and gas leases on the OCS, we conclude that after a gradual
transition period, during which plans are fully publicized, the final
sustained rate should be that which exhausts leasable lands over a
long enough period of time to justify increasing proportionately the
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capacity in the affected industries. As for coal and oil shale leases on
the public domain, we conclude that the rate of leasing should be
governed by the number of and trend in nominations by extractor
firms. Before giving our reasons for these conclusions, let us explain
why sudden "dumping" of leases would be inappropriate.
If the government accelerated the leasing of mineral lands sharply
and unexpectedly, we could expect several short-run effects that
would tend to depress realized rents below the pure economic rent
available. First, with additional lands to explore and develop, short-
run marginal costs in the lessee industries and supply industries
would tend to rise above long-run marginal costs. Second, except
where an effective price floor exists, as in the case of oil, short-run
demand inelasticities would tend to depress mineral prices with a
faster growth of output. 2 Third, due to imperfect equity capital
markets and the necessity of small firms to rely heavily upon in-
ternally generated equity capital, such firms might be unable to gen-
-rate equity capital at a rate corresponding to the rate of leasing. As
a result, competitiveness of bidding for leases would be lessened.
Fourth, the mineral industries in question might be unable at first to
perform desired predrilling exploration on all lands put up for lease.
-onsequently, uncertainty in bidding would be increased. Fifth,
;hort primary lease terms might reduce the expected thoroughness of
-xploration, thus increasing uncertainty at the time of leasing. All of
these considerations suggest a gradual build-up of the rate of leasing
.oward a new higher sustainable rate, with perhaps a transitional
ncrease in primary lease terms.
Aside from the considerations just given, there are relatively few
'actors to hamper accelerated leasing of oil and gas lands on the OCS.
Except along the interface with state lands, where oil and gas reser-
roirs may overlap the border, all the lands involved are federal lands;
:here is no checkerboarding with state or private lands, as is fre-
tuently encountered in the onshore public domain. There is no
;erious problem of competing or multiple uses of the lands, since
hipping and fishing are scarcely impaired, if at all, by oil and gas
)perations. The price of oil cannot be depressed by accelerated leas-
ng; additional production simply displaces imports at the going
world price set by OPEC. The situation is similar in the case of gas.
kdditional production simply reduces shortages at the regulated
)rice. The only significant impediment is environmental considera-
12. The demand for domestic oil is perfectly elastic at the OPEC price so long as some
)art of domestic consumption is supplied from foreign sources. It is unlikely, therefore, that
Lccelerated leasing of oil lands would depress prices.
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tions and resistance to leasing in new areas on these grounds. Subject
to this restraint, the government has great freedom to determine rate
of leasing.
The key to capturing a maximum of pure economic rent in the
long run for the OCS is an increase in the capacity of the lessee and
supply industries along with the increase in the rate of leasing. The
industries affected would willingly increase capacity appropriately if
the target rate of leasing were certain, and if that rate could be
sustained long enough that a normal rate of return could be earned
on the additional capacity without artificially depressing rents.
Hence, we conclude that the target rate of leasing should be that rate
which would exhaust leasable lands in such a period.
Accelerated leasing of coal lands in the public domain presents a
number of problems not present in the case of OCS oil and gas lands.
The federally owned lands are often checkerboarded with state or
private lands; the willingness of potential lessees to bid for federal
lands, and the size of their bids, may depend upon the ownership of
or terms of securing extraction rights on adjacent nonfederal lands.
This problem is intensified where the blocking up of an economical
mining unit requires rights on both federal and adjacent nonfederal
lands. The lands in question often have several alternative uses (e.g.,
forestry, grazing, recreation), not all of which would fit into a
multiple-use plan that includes coal mining. In many cases the federal
government has only mineral rights, having disposed of the surface
rights to private interests. Where it is necessary to use or alter the
surface in extracting coal, especially in the case of strip mining, the
necessity to acquire surface rights separately from and in addition to
sub-surface mineral rights may impede competitive bidding for the
latter. Due to environmental restraints on coal use, bottlenecks in
transportation, fixed investments in oil or gas burning equipment,
the short-run price elasticity of demand for coal is low. Con-
sequently, accelerated leasing of coal lands accompanied by similarly
accelerated mining might unduly depress coal prices and rents.
Finally, privately owned coal resources, in the East as well as the
West where federally owned resources are concentrated, are relatively
more abundant than privately owned oil and gas resources. Federal
restraint in leasing need not "starve" the economy for coal.
All these considerations argue against the approach to accelerated
leasing suggested for OCS oil and gas lands. Instead, we suggest a rate
of leasing that (1) allows the coal mining industry to secure rights to
federal coal deposits when the latter are richer (yield higher rents)
than alternative state or private deposits; (2) entails no sacrifice of
competition in the bidding for leases; and (3) reserves federal lands
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for that use or combination of uses that promises the greatest present
value of economic rent. The first condition would tend to assure
efficient development and use of the nation's total coal resources:
utilization of deposits in the order of their rent-yielding capacity.
The second condition tends to assure receipt of fair market value for
coal lands, while the third tends to assure that all federal lands are
allocated to their most valuable uses.
To make such an approach operational, we believe the government
should rely primarily upon nominations in selecting the lands for
lease and choosing a rate of leasing. The more nominations for a
particular tract, cet. par., the more valuable the tract is likely to be,
and the more competitive the prospective bidding. The more nomina-
tions for federal lands in the aggregate, cet. par., the more attractive
such lands would seem to be relative to alternative state or private
lands. A trend of increasing nominations in the aggregate would sug-
gest undue restraint in leasing; decreasing nominations would suggest
the reverse.
Of course it is not necessary to offer for lease all lands nominated.
Considerations of competition may suggest that only those tracts
receiving, for example, three or more nominations should be offered
for lease. Even if offered and bid upon, leases need not be granted
when, in the judgment of lessor officials, bidding is not sufficiently
competitive or the high bid falls substantially below independently
estimated fair market value. (Note that it is usually easier for the
government to determine fair market value in the case of coal than in
the case of oil and gas.)
As with coal, we believe that the numbers and trend in nomina-
tions should guide the pace of future oil shale leasing. It is highly
uncertain that the existing leases, resulting from the single 1974 sale,
will lead to profitable production of shale oil in the near future.
Given this uncertainty, it is doubtful that the government could
secure as much present value of economic rent if new leases were
offered "now," as if it waited until profitable production is demon-
strated and the extractive industry shows renewed interest in the
form of nominations. When given tracts receive a sufficient number
of nominations to assure competition in bidding-for example, in the
order of three or four, given the government's ability to make an
independent determination of a fair market value reservation price-
such tracts may be offered for lease without loss to the lessor. An
upward trend in nominations, per tract and in the aggregate, may be
taken as a signal to increase the rate of leasing. As with conventional
oil, there is no danger of "unduly" decreasing the price of shale oil
by too rapid leasing. Since shale oil is a close substitute for conven-
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tional oil, its price is effectively set by OPEC, and additional domes-
tic output would only displace imports.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The capture of pure economic rent through competition assumes
an identity of private and social costs. This in turn implies that
externalities in the form of environmental damage should be inter-
nalized. Otherwise, the rents received by the government would in-
clude an element which would be the equivalent of a tax on environ-
mental amenities, and the government's leasing program would not
maximize the value to society of the mineral resources.
The ideal way to internalize environmental externalities would be
to levy fees corresponding to environmental damage at each level of
output and allow mineral operators to choose that combination of
prevention, correction or compensation which maximizes profits.
This would assure efficiency of resource use in environmental pro-
tection while causing mineral prices to reflect full social costs. It is
recognized that in some instances a second-best approach may be
required. Without the knowledge that would allow us to equate
marginal cost with marginal benefit, standards that are more or less
arbitrary and that require preventive or corrective actions could be
imposed.
CONSERVATION REGULATION IN OIL PRODUCTION
The fact that unregulated competition among multiple operators
in a common oil reservoir leads to wasteful exploitation of the re-
source is familiar enough. It results from the rule of capture as the
effective law of ownership, the ability to attract oil and gas across
property lines by accelerating the rate of extraction on a given prop-
erty, and the negative dependence of ultimate recovery on the over-
all rate of extraction. Almost as familiar is the standard remedy:
regulatory restriction of the rate of extraction from an oil or gas
reservoir to the "maximum efficient rate," or MER. In current OCS
regulations MER is defined as "the maximum sustainable daily oil or
gas withdrawal rate from a reservoir which will permit economic
development and depletion of that reservoir without detriment to
ultimate recovery."' I This has been officially interpreted to mean
the rate of withdrawal that maximizes ultimate recovery, subject to
an acceptable rate of return on the total investment. 4
13. Geological Survey, Conservation Division, Gulf of Mexico Area, OCS Order No. 11 at
2.
14. Petroleum Industry, hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 75-78 (1975) (statement of Jack
W. Carlson).
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While this definition is distinctly superior to that typically em-
ployed by state conservation authorities, which runs in terms of
maximizing ultimate recovery without reference to economics, its
application in practice does not assure that operators would be able
to maximize the value of the resource in question and thus maximize
pure economic rent. To do this, operators should be permitted to
increase the rate of withdrawal from a reservoir to the point where
incremental value is zero, that is, where the rate of return on the
incremental outlay is just acceptable, regardless of the possible loss
of ultimate recovery and regardless of the overall rate of return.
Redefinition of MER as the optimum rate of withdrawal, or that
which maximizes the value of the reservoir, would further the ob-
jective of maximizing the economic rent generated and, being antici-
pated, bid by prospective lessees for federal leases.
But if this principle is recognized, there is a superior alternative to
regulation based on redefined MER. That alternative is compulsory
unitization of oil and gas reservoirs, with operator freedom as to the
rate of extraction. If left free, operators would choose that extrac-
tion rate and associated investment which promised to maximize the
value of the reservoir. Since under unitization their costs would coin-
cide with social costs, they would in their own interest tend to
maximize the value of the resource to society and hence maximize
pure economic rent. Anticipating freedom to maximize value, pros-
pective lessees would tend to bid away the available pure economic
rent in competitive bidding. Thus the objective of maximizing the
capture of pure economic rent would be served by requiring all reser-
voirs on federal lands to be unitized, and by giving operators in each
reservoir freedom to select the extraction rate. No new legislation is
required; the federal authorities have the power under existing law to
ompel reservoir unitization of federal leases.' 5
SUMMARY
In summary, we submit that the federal objective in mineral leas-
ng should be to capture a maximum of the present value of pure
-conomic rent. This objective would best be served by sealed bidding
n competition for leases; by granting leases on the basis of bonus
idding, with joint and sequential bidding allowed, and with pro-
iision for a modest royalty; by offering leases on the OCS at the
iighest rate sustainable for a period long enough to induce a corres-
9onding capacity in the affected industries; by offering leases on the
)ublic domain in response to nominations; by internalizing the costs
15. 30 U.S.C. §226(j) (1976) and43 U.S.C. §1334(a)(1) (Supp. V. 1975).
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of environmental damage, preferably by means of taxes that measure
damage; and by compelling the unitization of all oil and gas reser-
voirs discovered on federal lands, while granting operators freedom
to select the rate of extraction.
